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UPDATES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
PROSECUTOR V. LIMAJ, ET AL.,
CASE NO. IT-03-66
On November 30, 2005, Trial Chamber
II of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY or Tribunal)
issued a judgment in the case of Prosecutor v.
Limaj, et al. The Chamber acquitted Fatmir
Limaj and Isak Musliu, commanders in the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), for war
crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed in central Kosovo between
May and July 1998. The Chamber sentenced
Haradin Bala, the third defendant and a former foot soldier in the movement, to thirteen
years in prison for his role in the cruel treatment, torture, and murder of prisoners at a
KLA prison camp in the village of Lapusnik.
The KLA emerged in the mid-1990s as
an armed resistance movement to the official
Serb-dominated regime in Kosovo and grew
considerably in size from 1997-1999. It carried out numerous attacks on members of the
Serbian police and army in Kosovo and set
up roadblocks in the countryside. Despite
claims by Serbs and some observers that the
KLA is a terrorist organization, many
Kosovars regard it as a legitimate guerrilla liberation movement that was, prior to NATO’s
intervention, fighting against an oppressive
and authoritarian regime.
Throughout its tenure, the ICTY has
struggled to strike a balance between the
international community’s demand that
atrocities committed by Serbian forces be
prosecuted and the perception that certain
individuals, such as those who fought for the
KLA, are not being held to equal account.
Although the trial of Limaj, Musliu, and
Bala had been seen by many as an attempt
by the ICTY to avoid accusations of political
bias, critics contend that the acquittal of
Limaj and Musliu proves that the Tribunal is
a “victor’s court.”
The indictment against Limaj, Musliu,
and Bala claimed that KLA forces abducted
at least 35 civilians, Serbs and “perceived

Albanian collaborators,” who were detained
in the Lapusnik prison camp for prolonged
periods of time under inhumane conditions
and routinely subjected to assaults, beatings,
and torture. Fourteen named prisoners were
alleged to have been murdered in the course
of their detention. Ten additional prisoners
were allegedly executed in the nearby Berisa
Mountains on or about July 26, 1998, when
Serbian advances forced the KLA to abandon Lapusnik.
Each of the accused were charged with
eight counts for their acts at the Lapusnik
prison camp, including one count of imprisonment, two counts of torture, one count of
inhumane acts, two counts of murder as a
crime against humanity punishable under
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute, and two
counts of cruel treatment punishable as war
crimes under Article 3(7). The Prosecution
charged each of the accused for their individual criminal responsibility for these
crimes pursuant to Article 7(1) of the ICTY
Statute. In addition, Limaj and Bala were
each charged with two additional counts of
murder (one count charged murder as a
crime against humanity and one charged
murder as violation of the laws or customs of
war) for their alleged roles in the execution
of detainees in the Berisa Mountains.
Because Limaj and Musliu were alleged to
have exercised both de jure and de facto command over the KLA forces in charge of the
camp, the Prosecutor also charged them
with superior responsibility for all of the
alleged crimes pursuant to Article 7(3) of the
ICTY Statute. The Prosecution thus had to
prove that the alleged crimes against the
prisoners at Lapusnik did in fact occur and
that Limaj, Bala, and Musliu had committed
them or were responsible for their commission as superior officers within the KLA.
Evidence established that most of the 30
referenced detainees at the Lapusnik camp
were held in inhumane conditions and that
the camp itself was grossly overcrowded.
Several prisoners were tied by their hands
or feet, or both, and most were chained to
the wall and unable to move from their
positions, which forced them to soil them61

selves. Many prisoners suffered injuries
such as broken bones and gunshots for
which no medical treatment was provided.
The Prosecution also presented evidence
that the prisoners were regularly blindfolded, tied, and severely beaten or subjected to
other extreme violence by masked KLA
guards. Prisoners were forced to bury the
injured and disfigured corpses of fellow
prisoners, which the Tribunal characterized
as severe mental suffering. The Chamber
found that the detention and treatment of
prisoners in these conditions constituted
cruel treatment punishable as war crimes. It
also concluded that the evidence established four incidents of torture and three
murders of civilian prisoners at the
Lapusnik camp. The Chamber held, however, that the Prosecution had failed to provide enough evidence to prove its allegation
that 14 prisoners were murdered.
Five of the ten counts of the indictment
alleged crimes against humanity. To constitute a crime against humanity, the conduct
alleged must be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian
population. The Chamber dismissed these
five counts because the acts did not constitute crimes against humanity. In its decision
the Chamber stated that “there is evidence of
a level of systematic or coordinated organisation to the abduction and detention of certain individuals.” The Chamber went on to
explain, however, that “[w]hile the KLA
evinced a policy to target those Kosovo
Albanians suspected of collaboration with
the Serbian authorities, the Chamber finds
that there was no attack directed against a
civilian population, whether of Serbian or
Albanian ethnicity.”
As to the allegations that Limaj and Bala
participated in the execution of detainees,
the Chamber noted that when the KLA
closed the Lapusnik camp in July 1998 half
of the remaining detainees were marched
into the Berisa Mountains. The bodies, later
exhumed from graves in the area, were identified as part of the group who had remained
under KLA guard upon evacuation from
Lapusnik. Forensic examination further
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established that six of the nine victims died
from bullet wounds fired from Kalashnikov
rifles, which were the weapons traditionally
used by KLA guards. The Chamber found
this evidence sufficient to conclude that
these nine individuals were prisoners from
the Lapusnik prison camp and that they had
been executed by KLA guards.
The question of identification was central
to the Prosecution’s case against Limaj and
Bala. Although the Tribunal noted that there
was a “strong possibility” Limaj had been
personally present at the prison, it held that
the Prosecution had failed to prove his personal involvement in the crimes. Specifically,
there was conflicting testimony about Limaj’s
presence at the Lapusnik prison and in the
Berisa Mountains on the day of the executions. In weighing the evidence, the
Chamber concluded that the Prosecution
had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt
that Limaj had any role in the crimes committed at the camp. With regard to Musliu,
the judges also ruled that there was “little evidence to identify ... [him] as having any kind
of involvement in the prison camp.”
There was sufficiently more evidence
linking Bala to the Lapusnik camp and the
alleged murders of detainees. A number of
witnesses identified Bala as a guard at the
camp in June and July of 1998 and testified
that he had relatively frequent contacts with
prisoners. Bala was also identified as one of
the guards who escorted prisoners to the
Berisa Mountains. The Chamber did not
consider the evidence sufficient to prove that
Bala was criminally responsible for any of
the murders at the camp, but he was found
guilty of cruel treatment of prisoners based
in part on his personal role in maintaining
and enforcing the camp’s inhumane detention conditions. He was also found guilty of
one incident of torture and of participating
in the murder of the nine civilians in the
Berisa Mountains.
Although this trial brought to light the
horrific events surrounding the Lapusnik
camp, many have criticized the Tribunal’s
failure to categorize these acts as crimes
against humanity or to hold Limaj and
Musliu, the higher ranking KLA officials,
accountable. This has been a consistent critique of the Tribunal, which has struggled
against charges of political bias. Many in
Kosovo believe that the ruling vindicates the

KLA, which is often viewed as an amorphous group of guerilla forces, as a coherent
and established political organization. The
judgments have also raised speculation
about the potential outcome of the upcoming joint trial of former Prime Minister
Ramush Haradinaj and two others said to
have been his subordinates in the KLA. The
announcement of the Limaj judgment was
televised in Kosovo and celebrated in the
streets of Pristina. In Serbia, however, many
continue to wonder who, other than
Haradin Bala, will be held responsible for
the brutal crimes perpetrated against civilians at the Lapusnik camp.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA
PROSECUTOR V. ALOYS SIMBA,
CASE NO. ICTR-01-76-T
On December 13, 2005, Trial Chamber
I of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR or Tribunal) issued its judgment in the case of Prosecutor v. Simba.
Simba, a well-known political and military
figure, fought with the Rwandan Army from
1963 to 1967 and led the 1973 military coup
d’etat that brought former President Juvénal
Habyarimana to power. Simba’s military
achievements earned him prominence in
Rwanda; the government recognized him as
a national military hero and Rwandan
schools taught their students about his
achievements. From 1989 to 1993, Simba
served as a member of the Rwandan parliament representing Gikongoro prefecture.
The Prosecutor charged Simba with genocide, complicity in genocide, and the crimes
against humanity of extermination and murder. At the close of trial, the Prosecution withdrew the charges of complicity in genocide
and murder as a crime against humanity. The
Trial Chamber found Simba guilty of genocide and extermination as a crime against
humanity and sentenced him to 25 years
imprisonment. These convictions stemmed
from Simba’s responsibility for the killing of
thousands of Tutsi taking refuge at Murambi
Technical School, Cyanika Parish, and
Kaduha Parish following the death of
President Habyarimana and the start of the
genocide. On April 21, 1994, large groups of
interahamwe militia surrounded and systematically attacked each location with grenades,
guns, and traditional weapons.
62

The Trial Chamber found that Simba
participated in a joint criminal enterprise
(JCE) with local leaders and other prominent individuals to kill Tutsi civilians at
these three sites. Under the JCE form of liability, individuals may be held criminally
responsible for their “assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of a common
[criminal] purpose.” The actus reus for JCE
contains three elements: (1) “a plurality of
persons,” (2) “the existence of a common
purpose which amounts to or involves the
commission of a crime provided for in the
Statute,” and (3) “the participation of the
accused in the common purpose.” The basic
form of JCE, which the prosecutor alleged
in this case, requires that “all the co-perpetrators, acting pursuant to a common purpose, possess the same criminal intention.”
For crimes with special intent requirements,
all perpetrators must share the special intent.
Describing the three April 21, 1994,
attacks as “a highly coordinated operation”
that took place over the course of 12 hours,
the Trial Chamber determined that the only
reasonable explanation was that the attacks
were the result of prior coordination by a
plurality of persons acting with the common purpose of killing Tutsi. Although the
Trial Chamber did not accept the
Prosecutor’s argument that Simba had necessarily taken part in planning the attacks, it
found that he was a participant in the JCE
and had coordinated his actions with other
participants beforehand.
With regard to Murambi Technical
School and Kaduha Parish, the Trial
Chamber found that Simba’s presence during the course of the attacks, provision of
ammunition and weapons to the attackers,
and urging of the attackers to “get rid of the
filth” indicated that he shared the perpetrators’ common purpose of killing Tutsi. With
regard to the attacks at Cyanika Parish, however, the Trial Chamber had “some doubt
that he equally shared the common purpose
of killing Tutsi” because “there [was] no
direct evidence linking him to Cyanika
Parish or indicating that he knew and
accepted that it would also form part of the
operation.” Because the Trial Chamber had
previously determined that the killing of
Tutsi in all three attacks was part of a common plan in which Simba participated, it is
unclear why it sought to separately establish
his intent to kill Tutsi at Cyanika Parish.
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Based on his involvement in the JCE, the
Trial Chamber found Simba guilty of genocide for the massacres at Murambi Technical
School and Kaduha Parish. Noting that
Tutsi are an ethnic group under the Statute’s
definition of genocide, the Chamber found
that all the participants in the JCE, including the accused, intended to kill members of
a protected group. Moreover, the Trial
Chamber looked to the scale and context of
the massacres and found that the only reasonable conclusion was that the participants
possessed the specific intent to destroy the
Tutsi group in whole or in part.
Simba, however, argued that because of
his “close association with Tutsi and his tolerant views” he did not personally act with
the specific intent necessary for a finding of
genocide. The Trial Chamber agreed that
“there [was] no clear evidence that Simba
was among the adherents of a hard line antiTutsi philosophy,” but, referring to the
analysis of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in
Kvocka et al., found that evidence of politically moderate views does not preclude a reasonable trier of fact from finding “in light of
all the evidence provided” that an accused
has acted with the requisite intent. Pointing
to Simba’s words and actions at the massacre
sites, as well as his military background and
knowledge of the attacks, the Trial Chamber
found that “the only reasonable conclusion,
even accepting [the accused’s] submissions as
true, is that at that moment, he acted with
genocidal intent.” It is notable, however,
that the Kvocka Appeals Chamber’s reasoning was not in reference to genocidal intent,
but addressed whether discriminatory intent
had been established for the crime against
humanity of persecution.
The Trial Chamber held that Simba’s
participation in the massacres at Murambi
Technical School and Kaduha Parish also
met the requirements for extermination as a
crime against humanity. The Chamber
found that Simba had knowledge of the
widespread attacks against Tutsi civilians in
the area, was present at two of the massacre
sites, and supported and encouraged the
large-scale killing through his words and distribution of weapons.
In sentencing Simba to 25 years imprisonment, the Trial Chamber noted that,
although Simba was a principle perpetrator
in the JCE, he was not a formal member of

the government at the time, did not physically participate in the crimes, did not linger
at the massacre sites, and had subsequently
condemned the genocide. Moreover, the
Trial Chamber found that his prior record of
public service could plausibly indicate that
his crimes were motivated by “misguided
notions of patriotism and government allegiance rather than extremism or ethnic
hatred.” Noting that “a sentence of life
imprisonment is generally reserved [for]
those who planned or ordered atrocities and
those who participate in the crimes with particular zeal or sadism,” the Chamber determined that Simba’s crimes did not warrant
the most severe punishment.

JUVÉNAL KAJELIJELI V. PROSECUTOR,
CASE NO. ICTR-98-44A-A
On May 23, 2005, the ICTR Appeals
Chamber issued its judgment in Juvénal
Kajelijeli v. Prosecutor. Kajelijeli was
bourgmestre of the Mukingo Commune
from 1988 to 1993 and was reappointed to
that post in June 1994. In its 2003 judgment, Trial Chamber II found that in April
1994 Kajelijeli exercised control over the
Interahamwe militia, played an important
role in transporting members of the
Interahamwe to locations where they
attacked Tutsi, provided Interahamwe with
weapons for these attacks, and directed
Interahamwe to massacre Tutsi, which resulted in the deaths of more than 300 individuals. For these acts, the Trial Chamber convicted Kajelijeli of both individual and superior responsibility for genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity and sentenced him to two concurrent terms of life
imprisonment. The Trial Chamber also convicted him of individual responsibility for
direct and public incitement to commit
genocide, for which he received a concurrent
15-year sentence.
Kajelijeli filed appeals against his convictions, the length of his sentence, and the
Trial Chamber’s dismissal of his preliminary
motions challenging the Tribunal’s jurisdiction on the basis of the alleged illegality of
his arrest and detention. The Appeals
Chamber dismissed the majority of
Kajelijeli’s appeals. It agreed, however, that
the Tribunal had convicted Kajelijeli
improperly on the basis of superior responsibility and had violated Kajelijeli’s rights during his arrest and detention. Consequently,
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the Trial Chamber reduced his sentence to
45 years imprisonment.

CONVICTION ON THE BASIS OF
SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY
Kajelijeli submitted that the Trial
Chamber erred in finding that he exercised
leadership and effective control over the
Interahamwe and that he had the authority to
stop the killings in Mukingo, Nkuli, and
Kigombe Communes. Before addressing this
argument, the Appeals Chamber recalled
that in the Kordi and erkez case, among
others, the ICTY Appeals Chamber had
determined that “concurrent conviction for
individual and superior responsibility in relation to the same count based on the same
facts constitutes legal error invalidating the
Trial Judgment.” Endorsing this view, the
Appeals Chamber vacated Kajelijeli’s convictions for genocide and the crime against
humanity of extermination in so far as they
were made on the basis of superior responsibility and affirmed his convictions insofar as
they were based on a finding of individual
responsibility. Nevertheless, the Appeals
Chamber found it necessary to consider
whether Kajelijeli held a superior position
over the Interahamwe in order to determine
whether the Trial Chamber was correct in
considering his superior position as an aggravating factor for the purposes of sentencing.
The Appeals Chamber noted that a superior is someone who possesses either de jure
or de facto authority over subordinates and is
able to exercise effective control over them.
Rejecting Kajelijeli’s argument that to establish “effective control” there must be proof
that an accused exercises either “the trappings of de jure authority” or “authority
comparable to that applied in a military context,” the Appeals Chamber reiterated its
finding in the Bagilishema case that a de facto
civilian authority need only possess “the requisite degree of effective control.” In this case
the evidence showed that Kajelijeli played a
“pivotal role” in leading the attacks. For
example, the Trial Chamber found, inter
alia, that Kajelijeli instructed the
Interahamwe to kill Tutsis and supervised
attacks, and that the Interahamwe supplied
him with daily updates on their efforts.
Based on these facts, the Appeals Chamber
affirmed the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that
the Appellant held a de facto superior position as a civilian over the Interahamwe and
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found that the Trial Chamber had been correct to consider this position at sentencing.

VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
DURING ARREST AND DETENTION
Kajelijeli also alleged that the Trial
Chamber had erred in denying his motions
challenging the Tribunal’s personal jurisdiction on the basis of his alleged arbitrary
arrest and illegal detention — decisions that
the Appeals Chamber had itself twice
affirmed. Deciding that it has the “inherent
discretionary power” to correct any mistakes
made in the past, the Appeals Chamber
reconsidered Kajelijeli’s arguments. In its
analysis the Appeals Chamber recognized
two periods of his detention. The first period included the time from his arrest in
Benin until his transfer to Arusha, Tanzania.
The second period included the time from
his arrival in Arusha until his initial appearance before the Tribunal.

LEGALITY OF ARREST AND DETENTION
BENIN

IN

At the request of the ICTR Prosecutor,
in 1998 Benin authorities arrested Kajelijeli
without a warrant. Kajelijeli was held in custody in Benin for 85 days before he was
served with an ICTR arrest warrant or a
confirmed indictment, and he was not
brought before either a domestic or ICTR
judge for 95 days. Kajelijeli argued that his
arrest and detention in Benin were unlawful
under ICTR Rule 40, which authorizes the
Prosecutor to request that a state arrest a suspect preliminarily, and arbitrary under
human rights law. Moreover, he argued that
his right to be promptly informed of the
charges against him under human rights law
had been violated.
The Appeals Chamber noted that Rule
40 does not provide explicitly for a suspect’s
right to be promptly informed of the charges
against him or her or to be promptly
brought before a judge. The Appeals
Chamber also noted that “[i]t is for the
requested State to decide how to implement
its obligation under international law.” The
Prosecution, however, has “overlapping
responsibilities” with cooperating states and
must “ensure that, once it initiates a case,
‘the case proceeds to trial in a way that
respects the rights of the accused.’”
Consequently, the Prosecution has a twopronged duty: (1) to request state authorities

to bring a suspect promptly before a domestic judge so that his or her rights, including
to notice of the charges, are safeguarded; and
(2) to promptly request the Tribunal to provide the cooperating state with a provisional
arrest warrant and transfer order.
In determining whether the Tribunal had
met its obligations with regard to the legality of Kajelijeli’s arrest by the Benin authorities, the Appeals Chamber found that Rule
40 did not require the Prosecutor to provide
Kajelijeli with a copy of the arrest warrant.
Moreover, “given the exigencies of the circumstance in which he was arrested,” the
lack of either an ICTR or a domestic arrest
warrant did not violate his due process
rights. Kajelijeli was thus lawfully arrested
under Rule 40. Nevertheless, in accordance
with human rights law, “a suspect arrested at
the behest of the Tribunal has a right to be
promptly informed of the reasons for his or
her arrest, and this right comes into effect
from the moment of arrest and detention.”
Although there was a dispute as to whether
Benin authorities had informed Kajelijeli of
the reasons for his arrest, the Appeals
Chamber found that the Prosecutor could
not rebut Kajelijeli’s claim that he had not
been provided this information until he
received a copy of the ICTR warrant and
indictment 85 days after his arrest.
Consequently, the Appeals Chamber held
that Kajelijeli’s “right to be informed of the
reasons as to why he was deprived of his liberty was not properly guaranteed.”
In determining whether the Tribunal had
met its obligations with regard to the length
of Kajelijeli’s detention, the Appeals
Chamber emphasized that Rule 40, which
authorizes provisional arrest and detention
without an arrest warrant, must be read
together with Rule 40bis, which “allows for
the Prosecution, within a reasonable period
of time, to request a Judge of this Tribunal to
issue an order for the transfer of the suspect
from the custody of that State to the custody
of the Tribunal for purposes of provisional
detention prior to issuance of an arrest warrant and indictment.” A Rule 40bis request,
which should include any provisional
charges against the suspect and a summary
of the material on which the Prosecution has
relied in making the charges, along with the
order granting the request, must be served
on the suspect as soon as possible. Together,
Rule 40 and Rule 40bis “place time limits on
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the provisional detention of a suspect prior
to issuance of an indictment” and “ensure
that certain rights of the suspect are respected during that time.” Further,
The Appeals Chamber considers
that it is not acceptable for the
Prosecution, acting alone under
Rule 40, to get around those time
limits or the Tribunal’s responsibility to ensure the rights of the suspect in provisional detention upon
transfer to the Tribunal’s custody
under Rule 40 and 40bis, by using
its power under Rule 40 to keep a
suspect under detention in a cooperating State.
In determining whether the requirements of Rule 40 and Rule 40bis had been
met in this case, the Appeals Chamber noted
that, under human rights jurisprudence, the
right to be brought “promptly” before a
judge is violated if this does not take place
within a few days of detention. Moreover,
under human rights law, provisional detention of a suspect without charge is generally
discouraged, although it may be lawful “as
long it is as short as possible, not extending
beyond a reasonable period of time.” The
Appeals Chamber recalled that in the
Barayagwiza case it had previously determined that, in exceptional circumstances, a
suspect may be provisionally detained under
Rule 40bis without being formally charged
for a maximum of 90 days. This length of
provisional detention, however, would be
warranted only “so long as the protections
provided for the suspect’s rights under Rules
40 and 40bis of the Rules are adhered to.”
Because Kajelijeli’s rights were not adhered
to, i.e., he was neither promptly provided
with informal information as to the charges
of which he was accused nor promptly
brought before a judge, the Appeals
Chamber found that his detention in Benin
was unreasonable under both the ICTR
Rules and human rights law. Moreover, it
found that the Prosecution was partially
responsible for these violations because it
had failed to request a Rule 40bis transfer
within a reasonable period of time.

LEGALITY OF DETENTION IN ARUSHA
After Kajelijeli’s transfer to the Tribunal
detention facility, he was held in custody for
211 days prior to his initial appearance. He
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did not have assigned counsel for 147 of
those days. Agreeing with Kajelijeli that his
right to counsel had been violated by the
Tribunal, the Appeals Chamber found that
even if Kajelijeli frustrated efforts by the
Registry to provide him with counsel of his
choice Rule 44bis “clearly obligates the
Registrar to provide a detainee with duty
counsel, with no prejudice to the accused’s
right to waive the right to counsel.”
Moreover, Rule 44bis states that this requirement “exists from the very moment of transfer to the Tribunal and is not confined to
purposes of the initial appearance only.”
Likewise, the Appeals Chamber found
that the Tribunal had violated Kajelijeli’s
right to an initial appearance. It noted that,
on their face, Article 19(3) of the ICTR
Statute and Rule 62 of the Rules require that,
once an accused is taken into the Tribunal’s
custody, he or she should appear before the
Trial Chamber or a judge “without delay” in
order to be formally charged. The wording of
Rule 62 is “unequivocal” in this regard
because of the important purposes that the
initial appearance serves, including entering a
plea, reading the official charges against the
accused, ascertaining the identity of the
detainee, ensuring the rights of the accused
have been respected, giving the accused an
opportunity to voice complaints, and scheduling a date for the trial or sentencing.
Consequently, regardless of whether there
were difficulties in assigning counsel for
Kajelijeli, the Tribunal should have scheduled
his initial appearance without delay.

REMEDY FOR VIOLATION OF
APPELLANT’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
In examining whether these violations of
Kajelijeli’s fundamental rights should result
in the Tribunal’s loss of personal jurisdiction,
the Appeals Chamber found that, because it
must “maintain the correct balance between
“‘the fundamental rights of the accused and
the essential interests of the international
community in the prosecution of persons
charged with serious violations of international humanitarian law,” it should only
decline to exercise its jurisdiction “where to
exercise jurisdiction in light of serious and
egregious violations of the accused’s rights
would prove detrimental to the court’s
integrity.” For example, this may be appropriate when an accused is “seriously mistreated” before being turned over to the

Tribunal. Because the Appeals Chamber did
not consider the facts of this case to fall
within this exceptional category, it held that
that the remedy of setting aside jurisdiction
would be disproportionate. Instead, the
Appeals Chamber found that the appropriate remedy for these violations was to reduce
Kajelijeli’s sentence.

SENTENCING
Noting that the Trial Chamber “is
required to take into account any mitigating
circumstances in determining a sentence[,]”
the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial
Chamber erred in finding that Kajelijeli did
not deserve any credit for allowing his wife to
shelter four Tutsi in his Mukingo home,
offering words of comfort to them, and
agreeing not to evacuate his wife and children partly on their account. Nevertheless,
the Appeals Chamber held that the Trial
Chamber did not abuse its discretion in finding that these mitigating circumstances, even
if they had been taken into account, did not
require a reduction in Kajelijeli’s sentence.
With regard to its decision to vacate
Kajelijeli’s convictions based on superior
responsibility, the Appeals Chamber concluded that this change had no impact on his sentence. To remedy the violations of Kajelijeli’s
rights during his arrest and detention, however, the Appeals Chamber set aside Kajelijeli’s
two life sentences and 15-year sentence and
imposed a single sentence of 45 years imprisonment, minus credit for time served.

JEAN DE DIEU KAMUHANDA V.
PROSECUTOR,
CASE NO. ICTR-99-54A-A
On September 19, 2005, the ICTR
Appeals Chamber delivered its judgment in
the case of Jean De Dieu Kamuhanda v.
Prosecutor. Jean De Dieu Kamuhanda served
as Minister of Higher Education and
Scientific Research in the interim government of Rwanda from May 25, 1994, to
mid-July 1994. Before 1994 his various government positions had made him influential
in Gikomero Commune (Kigali-Rural
Prefecture). In its 2004 judgment, Trial
Chamber II found that during the genocide
Kamuhanda had distributed weapons to
members of the Interahamwe and others in
Gikomero. It also found that on April 12,
1994, Kamuhanda initiated and led attackers in slaughtering Tutsi who had taken
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refuge in a local church. The Trial Chamber
sentenced Kamuhanda to life imprisonment
after convicting him of genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity. The
Appeals Chamber dismissed all but one of
Kamuhanda’s allegations of error with
respect to the Trial Chamber judgment,
vacated his convictions as far as they were
based on the modes of responsibility of instigation and aiding and abetting, and confirmed his convictions as far as they were
based on the mode of responsibility of ordering. Despite this amendment to the conviction, the Appeals Chamber determined that
the “full picture of the case” had not
changed and thus no modification in sentencing was required.

MODES OF RESPONSIBILITY:
INSTIGATING, AIDING AND ABETTING,
ORDERING
Kamuhanda argued that the Trial
Chamber erred in finding him responsible
for genocide and extermination based on the
modes of responsibility of instigating, aiding
and abetting, and ordering. With regard to
instigation, Kamuhanda argued that the
Prosecutor had not shown a causal link
between his alleged incitement to kill and
the April 12, 1994, attack at Gikomero
Parish Compound. The Appeals Chamber
first noted that the Trial Chamber’s factual
findings were unclear as to which assailants
Kamuhanda had instigated. The Prosecution
asserted that the Trial Chamber’s factual
findings related to a meeting at
Kamuhanda’s cousin’s house a few days
before the Parish attack, during which
Kamuhanda distributed guns, grenades, and
machetes and encouraged those present to
distribute the weapons to others and to
begin the killing in Gikomero Commune.
The Prosecution argued that, due to
Kamuhanda’s influence and authority in
Gikomero, it was “only reasonable [for the
Trial Chamber] to conclude that the persons
who had been present during the meeting …
encouraged the perpetrators of the killings,”
even if they were not present at the attacks
themselves. The Appeals Chamber rejected
this reasoning as speculative due to the lack
of evidence that the individuals who met at
the cousin’s house were present at the massacre at the Parish Compound or that the
attackers came from Gikomero and thus
would necessarily have been influenced by
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Kamuhanda. As a result, it held that the
finding that Kamuhanda had instigated
assailants to kill members of the Tutsi ethnic
group was not supported by the evidence.
Kamuhanda also argued that the Trial
Chamber had erred in concluding that he
had aided and abetted the massacre at
Gikomero Parish Compound. The Appeals
Chamber again noted the lack of evidence
that anyone who had received a weapon at
Kamuhanda’s cousin’s house had taken part
in the attack or that any of the weapons
Kamuhanda distributed had been used in
the attack. Consequently, it disregarded this
factual finding. Nevertheless, it determined
that there were several other findings in the
record — including a finding that
Kamuhanda had told the attackers at the
Parish Compound to “work,” which was
understood as “an order to start the killings”
— that supported the conclusion that
Kamuhanda had directly and substantially
contributed to the killings at the Gikomero
Parish Compound as an aider and abetter.
Judge Schomburg disagreed with the
Appeals Chamber’s determination “that the
evidence does not support any connection
between the distribution of weapons and
the subsequent attack.” He asserted that the
Trial Chamber had reasonably proved such
a connection, particularly through the testimony of Witness GEK, a “highly credible”
witness who testified that the weapons distributed at the home were the ones used
during the massacre. Schomburg noted that
“even if the weapons that were distributed
by Kamuhanda had not been used at all,
their mere distribution amounted to psychological assistance, as it was an act of
encouragement that contributed substantially to the massacre, thus amounting to
abetting if not aiding.”
With regard to the Trial Chamber’s finding that Kamuhanda ordered the attackers to
kill the Tutsi who had taken refuge in the
Parish Compound, Kamuhanda asserted
that it had not been demonstrated that he
held a position of authority in relation to the
assailants. The Appeals Chamber, however,
found that a reasonable trier of fact could
conclude that Kamuhanda had authority
over the attackers because they obeyed his
order to start the massacre.
Although the Appeals Chamber determined that the facts supported Kamuhanda’s

conviction both for aiding and abetting and
ordering, it ultimately vacated the conviction in so far as it was based on aiding and
abetting. In doing so, the Appeals Chamber
noted that, because both of these modes of
responsibility were based on the same set of
facts (i.e., Kamuhanda leading the attack
and ordering the attackers to start the
killings), and because the finding that
Kamahunda had distributed weapons was
found to be insufficient to maintain a conviction for aiding and abetting, the mode of
responsibility of ordering “fully encapsulate[d]” Kamuhanda’s criminal conduct at
the Gikomero Parish Compound.
In separate opinions Judges Schomburg,
Shahabuddeen, and Meron expressed different views as to the basis for and appropriateness of this holding. Judge Schomburg
agreed with the decision to convict
Kamuhanda for “the more specific mode of
liability” and argued that it would be a “violation of the principle of logic to punish a
person for having ordered and aided and
abetted at the same time in relation to the
same offense if ordering and aiding and
abetting [were] based on the same criminal
conduct.” On the other hand, Judge
Shahabuddeen strongly disagreed with the
holding, which he found to be “a significant
extension” of the Chamber’s previous decisions regarding concurrent convictions.
Noting that “[t]he fact that more than one
method is employed does not mean that
there is more than one conviction for the
crime,” he asserted there was no reason why
an accused could not be convicted for a
crime based on multiple methods of responsibility so that the “true measure” of his or
her criminal conduct could be defined.
Although Judge Meron agreed with Judge
Shahabuddeen that an accused can be prosecuted for multiple modes of responsibility
for a single crime, in his view the Appeal
Chamber’s determination was “relevant only
to the factual findings of this particular
case.” For this reason he did not consider
this decision to make any change to the law
of the Tribunal.

ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY ADMITTED
REGARDING KAMUHANDA’S ALIBI
Unusually, the Appeals Chamber decided
to hear additional testimony with regard to
Kamuhanda’s alibi defense. Witness GAA
had testified before the Trial Chamber that
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he had seen Kamuhanda at the Gikomero
Parish Compound on April 12, 1994. In his
testimony before the Appeals Chamber,
however, GAA stated that he had not been at
the Parish Compound on April 12th but had
testified falsely because he had believed
Kamuhanda was responsible for the death of
many of his family members. Similarly,
Witness GEX had testified before the Trial
Chamber that Kamuhanda was present at
the Parish Compound on April 12th and
had started the attack by saying the word
“mukore,” which means “to work.” Before
the Appeals Chamber, however, GEX testified that she had not seen Kamuhanda at the
Parish that day and that she and several witnesses had colluded to incriminate
Kamuhanda.
Despite this testimony the Appeals
Chamber found it “highly implausible” that
these witnesses would have been able to
invent the detailed testimony they had originally provided, “which [was] corroborated by
other evidence.” The Appeals Chamber
noted that “[w]itness GAA was consistent for
many years in his statements that he had
been at the Gikomero Parish in 1994, and
that he had seen [Kamuhanda] there.”
Further, the Appeals Chamber took into
account that neither GEX nor GAA had contacted the Prosecution to recant their testimony, but instead first contacted the
Defense. The Appeals Chamber consequently dismissed the additional evidence in its
entirety and noted that “if additional evidence admitted on appeal is subsequently
determined by the Appeals Chamber to be
irrelevant or not credible, it provides no basis
for disturbing the Trial Chamber’s judgment,
since it could not have been a decisive factor
if the Trial Chamber had considered it.”

TRUTH COMMISSIONS IN TIMOR LESTE
COMMISSION OF TRUTH AND
FRIENDSHIP
In December 2004 Timor Leste and
Indonesia agreed on the establishment of a
joint Commission of Truth and Friendship
(CTF). The two governments established
the CTF to address reported violations of
human rights prior to and immediately following the East Timorese popular consultation in 1999, with a view to further promoting reconciliation and friendship and preventing a recurrence of similar violence. The
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CTF, however, was not officially formed
until March 9, 2005, and did not begin its
work until August 2005. Headquartered in
Bali, the CTF has a one-year mandate,
which may be renewed for a maximum of
one additional year. The CTF’s Terms of
Reference specify that it has the power to
access all available documents, “interview all
persons in possession of information considered relevant by the Commission,” and recommend amnesty for those “who cooperate
fully in revealing the truth.”
The first phase of the CTF was selecting
its members and handling other administrative matters. The ten-member panel is composed of legal experts, human rights figures,
and at least one retired military commander.
Indonesian members include Achmad Ali,
Wisber Loeis, Benjamin Mangkudilaga,
Petrus Turang, and Agus Widjojo; Timorese
members include Jacinto das Neves
Raimundo Alves, Dionisio da Costa Babo
Soares, Aniceto Longuinhos Guterres Lopes,
Felicidade de Sousa Guterres, and Cirilio
Jose Jacob Valadares Cristovao.
On December 16, 2005, the CTF
announced that it would confine its work to
reviewing the previous investigations and
court proceedings of the Indonesian
National Commission of Inquiry on Human
Rights Violations in East Timor in 1999 and
the Ad-hoc Human Rights Court on East
Timor, as well as the Special Panels for
Serious Crimes and the Commission of
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in
Timor-Leste. As previously announced by
Deputy Chief Benjamin Mangkoedilaga, the
second phase of the CTF commenced in
January 2006. The Commission’s effectiveness during this six-month fact-finding period will help determine if its mandate will be
renewed for another year.
Despite its establishment, the CTF has
been severely criticized by victims’ groups
and civil society in both Indonesia and
Timor Leste for being unrepresentative of
victims’ desire for justice and accountability
and for effectively promoting impunity. A
July 2005 letter to UN Secretary General
Kofi Annan signed by several leading international human rights groups has noted that
the Commission “runs against” every recommendation made by the Secretary General’s
2004 Report on the Rule of Law and
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-

Conflict Societies, including its lack of public support, its rushed establishment without
appropriate consultation, the lack of a transparent nominating process, and the absence
of guarantees of independence. Moreover,
the letter concluded that the Commission’s
mandate to recommend amnesties for those
who have committed crimes against humanity “is offensive to the victims and to every
principle of international human rights law.”

UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL
ADMINISTRATION IN EAST TIMOR
In October 1999 the United Nations
established a Transitional Administration in
East Timor (UNTAET), which organized
two bodies to address human rights violations committed in the wake of East Timor’s
referendum for independence from
Indonesia. One body, the Special Panel for
Serious Crimes (SPSC), had jurisdiction
over war crimes, genocide, and crimes
against humanity that took place from
January 1 - October 25, 1999. The SPSC
ceased operations on May 20, 2005, even
though no senior Indonesian perpetrators
had faced trial in Dili and that trials in
Jakarta of Indonesian military offices ended
in acquittals for all. A UN Commission of
Experts formed during the SPSC’s mandate
determined in June 2005 that the trials in
Jakarta for crimes committed in East Timor
were “manifestly inadequate, primarily due
to a lack of commitment on the part of the
prosecution,” and that “[m]any aspects of
the ad hoc judicial process reveal[ed] scant
respect for or conformity to relevant international standards.” As an alternative, it suggested the creation of an international tribunal such as those in Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia, but both Timor Leste and
Indonesia have rejected this suggestion as
unnecessary in light of the establishment of
the Commission of Truth and Friendship
(see above). The UN Commission further
found that there was “frustration among the
people of Timor-Leste about the inability of
the judicial process to bring to justice those
outside the country’s jurisdiction, particularly high-level indictees.”
also
established
a
UNTAET
Commission for Reception, Truth and
Reconciliation in Timor (CAVR) as a complement to the (now defunct) work of the
Serious Crimes Investigation Unit. The
CAVR investigated human rights abuses that
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occurred from 1974 to 1999 and issued its
final report to Timorese President Xanana
Gusmão in October 2005. On January 20,
2006, Timorese President Xanana Gusmão
presented the report to the United Nations.
The document outlines torture, arbitrary
killing, massacres, and the starvation of
some 100,000 to 180,000 East Timorese
during Indonesia’s 24-year occupation.
President Gusmão, Foreign Minister
José Ramos-Horta, and Defense Minister
Juwono Sudarsono have all publicly stated
that they do not want to pursue punishment of those responsible for these atrocities. They prefer to encourage efforts at reconciliation in the hopes of avoiding any
destabilization that could accompany criminal prosecutions and to avoid alienating
Indonesia, which is their most important
trading partner. Similarly, the Commission
on Truth and Friendship’s Terms of
Reference states that “Different countries
with their respective experiences have chosen different means on confronting their
past. The leaders and people of South
Africa, where apartheid was defined as a
crime against humanity, opted to seek truth
and reconciliation. Indonesian and TimorLeste have opted to seek truth and promote
friendship as a new unique approach rather
than the prosecutorial process.”
On February 14, 2006, Timorese Prime
Minister Mari Alkatiri announced that the
country will not seek economic compensation from Indonesia. This also makes it
unlikely that Timor Leste will seek reparations from countries that supported
Indonesia during the occupation, including
France, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Nevertheless, despite these
conciliatory actions, relations between
Indonesia and Timor Leste remain strained.
Following the release of the CAVR report,
Indonesia cancelled meetings that had been
scheduled between the presidents of both
countries to discuss human rights abuses.

EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE
COURTS OF CAMBODIA
In December 2005 the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
(ECCC) approved a facility in Kambol as its
headquarters, where operations began in midFebruary. The site, which was officially presented to the Royal Government Task force for
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the Khmer Rouge trials on January 18, 2006,
will also house the UN component of the
court led by Administrative Deputy Director
Michelle Lee. Because the site is located several kilometers outside of Phnom Penh, the
ECCC will need to install public transportation to facilitate access by ordinary citizens.

TRIBUNAL
The ECCC has three goals: to offer justice to victims and survivors of crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge from April 17,
1975, to January 6, 1979; to prevent similar
atrocities in the future; and to give younger
generations of Cambodians better information about the crimes that occurred under
the Khmer Rouge regime.
The ECCC will consist of two chambers:
a trial chamber with three Cambodian
judges and two international judges and an
appellate chamber, known as the Supreme
Court Chamber, composed of four
Cambodian judges and three international
judges. Judgments will necessitate a super
majority, which requires international judges
to concur in any judgment. The ECCC’s
mandate gives it personal jurisdiction over
“senior leaders” and “those most responsible
for the most serious violations,” including
war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, crimes against internationally protected
person, and violations of Cambodia’s 1956
Penal Code. The ECCC’s temporal jurisdiction will cover 1975-1979, the period when
the Khmer Rouge governed Cambodia.
On March 15, 2006, the Cambodian
government and the United Nations worked
out the final details for the ECCC. The
agreement covered topics such as security
and safety arrangements, as well as outlining
how facilities and services will be provided.
The Cambodian government will provide
the trial buildings, detention facilities for the
accused, safe housing for witnesses, and all
electricity, water, and telephone services,
while the UN will provide vehicles, computers, training, and general support for the
defense. Trials are expected to commence in
2007. Judicial and prosecutorial appointments are expected by July of this year.

SUSPECTS
The ECCC will focus on trying the highlevel officials of the Khmer Rouge regime.
The Cambodian Documentation Center has

identified some of the suspects it expects will
face charges.
Ieng Sary was foreign minister in the
Khmer Rouge regime. There is evidence that
he publicly encouraged arrests and executions. He is 76 years old and currently lives in
Phnom Penh under police protection. It was
reported on February 18, 2006, that Ieng
Sary was very ill and suffering from heart
complications, but his daughter, Ieng Vithika,
has said that her father is in good health.
Kaing Khek Ieu was the commander of
the secret police prison S-21, known for its
brutal torture and interrogation techniques.
He is now 63 years old and has been in military custody since 1999.
Khieu Samphan was the president of
Democratic Kampuchea (as the country
was called under the Khmer Rouge). He is
74 years old and currently lives in Pailin, a
former Khmer Rouge stronghold in northwest Cambodia.
Nuon Chea was known as Brother No. 2,
second only to Pol Pot in the Khmer Rouge.
As the leading ideologue of the Khmer
Rouge, he is suspected of devising and
implementing the execution policies of the
Khmer Rouge regime. He is now 79 years
old and lives in Pailin near Khieu Samphan.
Ung Choeun was the commander of the
military under the Khmer Rouge. He was
known as “the Butcher” and is rumored to
have been one of the cruelest of the Khmer
Rouge leaders. He is currently 78 years old
and has been in military custody since 1999.

BUDGET
Upon the ECCC’s formation, the United
Nations and Cambodia agreed to share its
costs. Under this agreement, the UN would
provide $43 million and Cambodia would
cover the remaining $13 million. Cambodia
has had significant problems meeting its
share of costs, and the ECCC is now seeking
more donors and funding.
In October 2005 India contributed $1
million to the Cambodian government earmarked for the ECCC. On December 28,
Commission
2005,
the
European
announced that it would provide $1.2 million to help Cambodia cover its portion of
the ECCC’s costs. Thailand has contributed
$25,000, and Armenia and Namibia have

contributed $1,000 and $500, respectively.
On March 12, 2006, trial press officer Reach
Sambath announced that six major donors
(out of 27 participating countries) have
agreed to release funds left over from United
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
to fill the ECCC’s $9.6 million budget
shortfall; three major donors have asked for
more time to decide.
Through the work of the Documentation Center of Cambodia, the United States
has spent millions of dollars funding
research and documentation of alleged war
crimes committed in Cambodia. The U.S.
has refused to support the ECCC, however,
either through the UN or through direct
support to the government. The United
States Foreign Operations Appropriations
Acts of 2004 and 2005 bar funding to Cambodia because of the sporadic political violence the government has allegedly condoned. Because the 2006 Foreign Operations Appropriation Act does not contain
similar prohibitions, however, the U.S. may
provide support in the future.

INTERNATIONAL COMMENTS
In late January 2006, Human Rights
Watch expressed concerns that the ECCC
will not meet international standards given
Cambodia’s notoriously corrupt judiciary.
The group noted particularly the importance that the ECCC be free from government control, interference, and intimidation. Nevertheless, most international
organizations support the ECCC because it
is likely Cambodia’s last opportunity to see
any accountability for Khmer Rouge crimes.

NEW AND NOTABLE
EXTRADITION OF CHARLES TAYLOR TO
SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA
LEONE

THE

On March 26, 2006, the Special Court
for Sierra Leone’s Chief Prosecutor,
Desmond de Silva, officially requested that
Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo
“have his authorities execute the warrant for
the arrest of Charles Taylor issued by the
Special Court and transmitted to Nigeria in
November 2003.” De Silva’s request came
shortly after newly elected Liberian
President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf told the UN
continued on back cover
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Security Council that she had formally
asked President Obasanjo to extradite
Taylor so he could stand trial at the Special
Court. On March 29, 2006, Nigerian police
arrested Taylor as he was attempting to cross
into Cameroon and “repatriated” him to
Liberia, whereupon he was placed in the
Special Court’s custody.
Taylor served as President of Liberia form
1997 to 2003 and was indicted by the Court
in March 2003 for war crimes committed
during the civil war that gripped much of
the region in the early 1990s. On April 3,
2006, Taylor made his initial appearance
before the Court and pled not guilty to
eleven counts of the amended indictment,
including five counts of crimes against
humanity (murder; rape; sexual slavery and
any other form of sexual violence; other
inhumane acts; and enslavement) and six
counts of violations of Article 3 common to
the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocol II (acts of terrorism; murder; outrages upon personal dignity; cruel treatment;

conscripting or enlisting children under the
age of 15 years into armed forces or groups,
or using them to participate actively in hostilities; and pillage). Citing security concerns, the Special Court has since formally
requested that the Netherlands host Taylor’s
trial, an option that President JohnsonSirleaf also supports.

DEATH OF SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC
On March 11, 2006, Slobodan
Milosevic, former President of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia was found dead in
his cell in the Scheveningen Detention Unit
of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). ICTY
President Judge Fausto Pocar ordered a full
inquiry into his death, although Dutch
authorities later confirmed that Milosevic,
who suffered from chronic heart ailments,
died of natural causes. On March 14, 2006,
the Trial Chamber that was trying
Milosevic ordered the proceedings against
HRB
him terminated.
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